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Court-ordered Mental and Physical Examinations:
A Survey of Federal Rule 35 and Illinois Rule 215
INTRODUCTION
One of the most frequently employed' discovery devices in civil
suits2 is a physical or mental examination of one of the parties.
Ordinarily, parties stipulate to the examination informally.' How-
ever, when parties are unable to agree, resort to Federal Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 354 or its Illinois counterpart, Supreme Court Rule
1. W. GLASER, P~mrAL DisCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as GLASER].
2. The use of mental and physical examinations in criminal procedure is beyond the
scope of this article. Court-ordered examinations have been used in a diverse array of civil
suits. See, e.g., Bodnar v. Bodnar, 441 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971)
(to determine competency of plaintiff to maintain action); Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479
(D.C. Cir. 1940) (to determine paternity of child in divorce action); Securities and Exchange
Comm'n v. W.L. Moody & Co., 374 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (to determine competency
in temporary receivership proceeding); Swift v. Swift, 64 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (to
determine competency of party to file suit); Buck v. Board of Ed., 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 165
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (to determine competency of high school counselor in reinstatement
proceeding).
A mental examination was recently requested in a building code violation case. The de-
fendant had consistently refused to clean up six feet of garbage completely covering his yard
and obstructing access to his home. The defendant asserted that the garbage was valuable
as antiques and firewood. In actuality it was broken down furniture covered with spoiled
food, rusting metal and old rags. The court granted the county's request for a mental exami-
nation of defendant. County of Cook v. Wilichinski, No. 79ml-469744 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct.,
filed July 31, 1979). The foregoing cases are only a few of the various actions in which court
ordered examinations have been requested.
3. See Bufilngton v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965); Postell v. Amana Refrigeration,
Inc., No. C78-150A (N.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 1980); Liechty v. Terrill Trucking Co., 53 F.R.D. 590
(E.D. Tenn. 1971); Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Advisory Commit-
tee Note on 1970 Amendment FE. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(3) [hereinafter cited as Amendment
Committee Note]; GLASER, supra note 1, at 33; Hausheer, Rule No. 35 - A Methodology for
Obtaining Medical Examinations of Litigants, 46 J. KANS. B.A. 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Hausheer].
4. FED. R. Crv. P. 35 states: (a) Order for Examination. - When the mental or physical
condition (including the blood group) of a party, or a person in the custody or under the
legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order
the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician or to produce for
examination the person in his custody or legal control. The order may be made only on
motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all
parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination
and the person or persons by whom it is to be made. (b) Report of Examining Physician. (1)
If requested by the party against whom an order is made under Rule 35(a) or the person
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215,8 is necessary.
examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a
detailed written report of the examining physician setting out his findings, including results
of all tests made, diagnoses and conclusions, together with like reports of all earlier exami-
nations of the same condition. After delivery the party causing the examination shall be
entitled upon request to receive from the party against whom the order is made a like report
of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same condition, unless, in the case
of a report of examination of a person not a party, the party shows that he is unable to
obtain it. The court on motion may make an order against a party requiring delivery of a
report on such terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make a report the
court may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial. (2) By requesting and obtaining a
report of the examination so ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party
examined waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same
controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may there-
after examine him in respect of the same mental or physical condition. (3) This subdivision
applies to examinations made by agreement of the parties, unless the agreement expressly
provides otherwise. This subdivision does not preclude discovery of a report of an examining
physician or the taking of a deposition of the physician in accordance with the provisions of
any other rule [hereinafter cited as Rule 351.
5. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215 states: Physical and Mental Examinations of Parties
and Other Persons. (a) Notice; Motion; Order. In any action in which the physical or mental
condition of a party or of a person in his custody or legal control is in controversy, the court
upon notice and for good cause shown on motion made within a reasonable time before the
trial, may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician
suggested by the party requesting the examination, or to produce for such examination the
person in custody or under legal control who is to be examined. The court may refuse to
order examination by the physician suggested but in that event shall permit the party seek-
ing the examination to suggest others. A party or person shall not be required to travel an
unreasonable distance for the examination. The order shall fix the time, place, conditions,
and scope of the examination and designate the examining physician. (b) Physician's Fee
and Compensation for Loss of Earnings. The party requesting the examination shall pay the
fee of the examining physician and compensation for any loss of earnings incurred or to be
incurred by the party or person to be examined in complying with the order for examina-
tion, and shall advance all reasonable expenses incurred or to be incurred by the party or
person in complying with the order. (c) Physician's Report. Within 21 days after the com-
pletion of the examination, and in no event later than 14 days before trial, the examining
physician shall prepare duplicate originals of a written report of the examination, setting
out his findings, results of all tests made, his diagnosis and conclusions, and deliver or mall
an original of his report and of all corrections, supplements, or additions thereto, to the
attorney for the party requesting the examination and a duplicate original thereof to the
attorney for the party examined or for the party who produced the person who was ex-
amined. The court may enforce compliance with this requirement. If the report is not deliv-
ered or mailed to the attorney for the party examined, or for the party who produced the
person who was examined, within the time herein specified or within any extensions or mod-
ifications thereof granted by the court, neither the physician's report nor his testimony or
his findings or X-ray files or the results of any tests he has made may be received in evi-
dence except at the instance of the party examined or who produced the person examined.
(d) Impartial Medical Experts. (1) Examination Before Trial. At a reasonable time in ad-
vance of the trial, the court may on its own motion, or that of any party, order an impartial
physical or mental examination of a party whose mental or physical condition is in issue,
when in the court's discretion it appears that such an examination will materially aid in the
just determination of the case. The examination shall be made by a member or members of
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This article will examine the requirements and procedures of
court-ordered examinations. The operation of Federal Rule 35 will
be discussed and Illinois Rule 215 will be compared and contrasted
with the federal practice. Revisions and improvements will be sug-
gested for both rules. Finally, an analysis will be made of the possi-
ble effects of the new Illinois Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Confidentiality Acts on Illinois Rule 215.
FEDERAL RULE 35
History
The United States Supreme Court first decided whether federal
courts could require examinations in Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford.7 In Botsford, the Court held that federal courts had no
inherent power to order physical examinations. In Camden and
Suburban Railway Co. v. Stetson,8 however, the Court sanctioned
federal court-ordered physical examinations when a statute of the
forum state permitted such examinations.
In 1938,9 the Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 0 Rule 35 permitted court-ordered examinations
in all federal civil cases. The Supreme Court held the rule valid in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc."
a panel of physicians chosen for their special qualifications by the Illinois State Medical
Society. (2) Examination During Trial. Should the court at any time during the trial find
that compelling considerations make it advisable to have an examination and report at that
time, the court may in its discretion so order. (3) Copies of Report. A copy of the report of
examination shall be given to the court and to the attorneys for the parties. (4) Testimony
of Examining Physician. Either party or the court may call the examining physician or phy-
sicians to testify. Any physician so called shall be subject to cross-examination. (5) Costs
and Compensation of Physician. The examination shall be made, and the physician or phy-
sicians, if called, shall testify without cost to the parties. The court shall determine the
compensation of the physician or physicians. (6) Administration of Rule. The Administra-
tive Director and the Deputy Administrative Director are charged with the administration
of the rule [hereinafter cited as Rule 215].
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 801 et seq. (1979).
7. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
8. 177 U.S. 172 (1900).
9. By 1938, courts in thirty states could order physical examinations. Twenty-two state
courts had ordered examinations based on their inherent power to do so. Eight state legisla-
tures had passed statutes which were held constitutional allowing such examinations. See
Draper, Medical Examinations of Adversary Parties, 25 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. 163
(1952-1953) [hereinafter cited as Draper]; Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
HARv. L. REv. 940, 1024-1026 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Developments in Discovery].
10. These rules were enacted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §2072.
Under this Act, Congress gave to the Supreme Court power to promulgate procedural court
rules.
11. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Accord Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). Prior to Sib-
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Elements of Rule 35(a)
Who May Be Examined
Rule 35 empowers a court to order examinations of the parties"2
or persons under the legal control or custody of a party." Thus,
when a parent sues to recover for a minor child's injury, the court
may order an examination of the child.14 Also, where a husband
denies paternity of his wife's child in a divorce action the court
may order a blood test of the child.1 5
Several litigants have attempted to expand the scope of persons
subject to Rule 35 examination. Courts have uniformly rejected
these efforts, even when the potential examinees were significantly
related to the lawsuits. Thus, where a child sued for declaration of
United States citizenship, the appellate court held it erroneous to
order blood tests of her alleged parents.16 The court noted that
they were not parties; nor were they under the control of their pu-
tative daughter for purposes of Rule 35.17 Similarly, courts have
rejected requests that guardians ad litem be ordered to submit to
examinations.' 8 These judges have reasoned that the guardian ad
litem is an agent of the court, and as such he is not seeking relief
for himself as a "party."' 9
Additionally, a court may not use Rule 35 to order examinations
of a party's employee. In 1970, a committee studying amendments
bach, other lower federal courts had held Rule 35 constitutional. See, e.g., Countee v.
United States, 112 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1940).
12. The focus on parties permits procedural manipulations. For example, in Clark v.
Geiger, 31 F.R.D. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1962), where the original and third party actions were sev-
ered for trial, the original plaintiff could not be ordered to submit to an examination in the
third party action a year after verdict was reached in his own trial. The plaintiff was not a
'party' in the third party action even though the cases were not severed until just prior to
trial. Thus, by procedural maneuvering such as severing or consolidating trials, a party can
have an effect on a court's authority.
13. Rule 35 was amended in 1970 to include persons under the control or in the custody
of a party. This modification responded to the liberal trend of the case law. See Yee Szet
Foo v. Dulles, 18 F.R.D. 237, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Developments in Discovery, supra note 9,
at 1023.
14. Amendment Committee Note, supra note 3.
15. Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Accord Beckwith v. Beckwith, 355
A.2d 537 (1976) (District of Columbia Rule 35 interpreted the same).
16. Scharf v. United States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979).
17. Id. at 1244.
18. Scharf v. United States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979); Fong Sik
Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955).
19. See, e.g., Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955). "The fact that a
guardian is subject to certain controls of the court no more makes him a party ... than it
does a party litigant's attorney. . ." Id. at 76.
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to the rule rejected a proposal to include these persons.20 This
exclusion should not significantly affect the outcome of litigation.
Usually, when an employee's physical or mental condition is im-
portant, he can be joined as a party,2" and then will be subject to
the rule. If, after the examination, his participation in the trial is
not desired, he can be dismissed.
Finally, one court rejected an attempt to use a court-ordered
examination to bootstrap a person into the scope of Rule 35. In
Schuppin v. Unification Church,2 parents sought an examination
of their adult daughter to prove that defendant-church had brain-
washed her, rendering her incompetent. Thus, the parents as par-
ties-plaintiff in effect sought an examination of a person who was
neither a "party" nor, until an adjudication of incompetency,
under their custody or control. Accordingly, the court refused to
order the examination of a presumably competent adult to show
that she should be put under the custody of a party.23
Thus, federal courts have strictly adhered to the letter of Rule
35. These decisions are consistent with earlier proclamations that
federal courts have no inherent ppwer to order examinations.
2 4
Therefore, any future expansion of the scope of persons subject to
Rule 35 will have to come via legislation or rule amendment.25
The "In Controversy" Element
The court cannot order an examination unless the mental or
physical condition of the potential examinee is in controversy. 2
Wadlow v. Humberd2 7 originally defined the "in controversy" re-
quirement. In Wadlow, the plaintiff complained that defendant
had libeled him. Defendant had published an article which stated
20. Amendment Committee Note, supra note 3. The Committee rationalized that similar
state provisions were unused.
21. However, a party may not always want to join an employee. See notes 104-105 infra
and accompanying text.
22. 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt.), afl'd, 573 F.2d 1295 (1977).
23. Id. at 605-606. Presumably the parents first would have had their daughter declared
incompetent in a separate proceeding.
However in some cases evidence is presented which raises questions about the competency
of the plaintiff to understand the nature of the litigation. In this situation, the court has
authority to order an examination. See Bodnar v. Bodnar, 441 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); Swift v. Swift, 64 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Buck v. Board of
Education, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
24. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
25. But see note 105 infra and accompanying text.
26. Rule 35(a), supra note 4.
27. 27 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
1980]
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that the plaintiff suffered from various physical and mental defi-
ciencies. The defendant alleged that the statements were true. To
prove this defense, he moved for an examination of plaintiff. The
court denied this motion, holding that the party's condition must
be "immediately and directly" in controversy.28 The court based
this interpretation on its reasoning that Rule 35 was intended to
apply only to personal injury actions. 29
This approach was disapproved in Beach v. Beach.0 In Beach,
the husband in a divorce action contended that he was not the
father of his wife's child and argued that he therefore should not
have to pay for the child's maintenance. The court ordered a blood
test of the mother and child and held that the issue of paternity
was in controversy, even though it did not meet the "immediately
and directly" test of Wadlow.81
The movant must satisfy the court that he has met the "in con-
troversy" element for each examination requested.2 This can be
shown by the pleadings or by affidavit. These papers must allege
specific defects which put in issue the condition of the person
against whom examination is sought.3 3
Good Cause
Under Rule 35, the court must find good cause to order an exam-
ination.-" The Supreme Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder,85 recog-
nized that "good cause" requires that the movant show a greater
need than mere relevancy.3 ' The burden is modified depending on
28. Id. at 212.
29. The court reasoned that Rule 35 was promulgated to bring state practice into the
federal system. The court stated that all of the state cases on point concerned personal
injury actions. Thus, Rule 35 applied only to personal injury actions. The court does admit
that it may have "overlooked some of the decisions." Id.
30. 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Additionally, Wadlow was severely criticized by com-
mentators. Draper, supra note 9, at 174; King, A Study of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 11 CAROLNA L.Q. 185 (1959) [hereinafter cited as King]; Note, Physical
and Mental Examinations of Parties Under New Federal Rule 35(a), 34 ILL. L. Rav. 103
(1939).
31. Wadlow v. Humberd, 114 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
32. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
33. Id. at 120-21. See also Postell v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., No. C78-150A (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 5, 1980).
34. Rule 35(a). As with the "in controversy" element, good cause must be shown for each
exam requested. Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
35. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
36. Id. at 118. This imposes certain constraints on the availability of examinations. Spe-
cifically, the movant will not be able to compile cumulative evidence. If he has obtained
sufficient information of a party's condition under other discovery rules, he will have little
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which party places the examinee's condition in issue. Furthermore,
the necessary showing depends on the facts of each case. For ex-
ample, when a party asserts his condition as a basis for a claim or
defense, his opponent's burden is reduced, 7 and the pleadings
alone are sufficient to fulfill the good cause requirement 8 How-
ever, when a party's condition is an element of his opponent's
claim or defense, the party requesting the exam must make an af-
firmative showing of good cause.
This good cause requirement is illustrated by Schlagenhauf. In
Schlagenhauf, the passengers of a bus were injured when their bus
collided with a tractor-trailer. They sued the bus driver and the
trailer owner. The trailer owner cross-claimed against the bus
driver alleging that the driver's eyes and vision were impaired. The
trailer owner asked the court to order psychiatric, neurological, vis-
ual, and internal medical exams of the bus driver. The court held
that the allegations were insufficient to establish good cause, and
that the owner should have alleged specific neurological, psychiat-
ric, and internal maladies which were capable of discovery by the
examinations.8
An even higher showing was required in Marroni v. Matey.40 In
Marroni, the court held that the party who puts his opponent's
condition in controversy cannot satisfy the good cause requirement
unless he establishes that he cannot obtain information regarding
the condition elsewhere. 1
These cases evidence varying concern for the privacy rights of
litigants. When a party places his own condition in controversy, it
is arguable that his privacy interests cannot be offended. Accord-
ingly, such a party should not be able to assert the condition yet
prevent testing of the allegation. However, where a party's condi-
success in obtaining a Rule 35 order. See Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 871 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1969); 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE, 35.03, at
35-20 (2d ed. 1948); Hausheer, supra note 3 at 18; King, supra note 30, at 188; Annot., 13 L.
Ed. 2d 1002 (1964).
37. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). See Buffington v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292
(3d Cir. 1965); Lewis v. Neighbors Construction Co., 49 F.R.D. 308 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
38. This standard is exemplified by Leach v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444
(S.D. Miss. 1942). In the affidavit accompanying his request for an examination, the defen-
dant stated merely that he had reason to believe that the plaintiff had exaggerated his in-
juries. The court held that sufficient good cause was shown for the examination.
39. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
40. 82 F.R.D. 371 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
41. Id. at 372. The court mandated that "less intrusive methods of discovery first be
explored." Id.
1980]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 11
tion is asserted by his opponent, courts should be more cognizant
of the privacy rights of the persons examined. Since such an ex-
aminee is not using his condition for gain by basing a claim or de-
fense on it, he should be entitled to the added protection of the
stricter "good cause" burden in such an instance."' Hence, applica-
tion of varying "good cause" standards strikes the necessary bal-
ance between-the right to privacy and the need for full and com-
plete discovery.
Procedural Considerations
When requesting an examination, the movant must give notice
to the person to be examined and to all parties.' The motion itself
should be accompanied by an affidavit showing that the request
meets the requirements of the rule. Even when the elements of the
rule are met, the court has complete discretion to grant or deny
the motion." This discretion extends as well to the number" and
type46 of examinations ordered. Further, the court decides who
selects the physician 7 and who can be present at the examina-
42. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963), vacated, 379 U.S. 104
(1964).
43. Rule 35(a), supra note 4.
44. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (N.D. Miss. 1970). See Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Negren Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Boyette, 111 F.2d
579 (5th Cir. 1940); Stuart v. Burford, 42 F.R.D. 591 (D.C. Okla. 1967).
45. See Mayer v. Illinois Northern Ry., 324 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 907 (1964) (second exam allowed where first based on insubstantial inquiry); Lewis v.
Neighbors Const. Co., 49 F.R.D. 308 (D.C. Mo. 1969) (second examination necessary where
first one was two years before); Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387 (D.C. Ohio 1967) (a
second examination is permitted in some situations).
46. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (the Court allowed one eye exami-
nation, but rejected the other three types requested); Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169
(N.D. Ohio 1944) (court ordered painful cytoscopic examination); Hernandez v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court rejected petition for painful bone
scan).
47. The defendant usually presents a selection to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff objects,
the court may appoint a physician of its choice. See Liechty v. Terrill Trucking Co., 53
F.R.D. 590 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Stuart v. Burford, 42 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Okla. 1967); Pierce v.
Brovig, 16 F.R.D. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); The Italia, 27 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Annot.,
33 A.L.R.3d 1012 (1970). See also Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549 P.2d 846,
130 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (court may appoint the defendant's choice over plaintiff's objec-
tions). But see State ex rel. McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127 (1978) (court should not have
appointed plaintiffs own personal physician as the doctor for the defendant's motion).
However, one state court held that the court has no discretion in this matter. It is the
defendant's choice that controls. "A defendant shall have the same right, in the absence of
agreement by the parties as to who the examining physician will be." Timpte v. District
Court of Denver, 161 Col. 309, 310, 421 P.2d 728, 729 (1966). See also Note, Civil Proce-
dure-Discovery-Right to Select Examining Physician Under Rule 35, 39 U. COL. L. Rv.
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tion. " If the court denies the motion, the order is interlocutory
and generally not appealable." Nor is the order generally review-
able by a petition for mandamus, unless a clear abuse of discretion
has been demonstrated. 60
If the court grants the motion, the party requesting the exam
ordinarily pays the doctor's fees.51 The person examined, however,
bears the cost of his lost time."
Finally, where a party refuses to submit to an ordered examina-
tion, the court may impose "just" sanctions, including those enu-
merated in Rule 37(b)(2)." The court may strike the pleadings of
592 (1967).
48. Most courts allow the personal physician of the examined party to be present. See
Warrick v. Brode, 46 F.R.D. 427 (D. Del. 1969); Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26
F.R.D. 595 (D. Md. 1960); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 881 (1966).
But see Sanden v. Mayo Clinic, 495 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1974), where the personal physician
was not allowed to be present. The court said special circumstances warranted this decision.
The party to be examined was a registered nurse.
The presence of the examined person's attorney is not permitted generally. See Branden-
berg v. El Al Israel Airlines, 79 F.R.D. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Warrick v. Brode, 46 F.R.D. 427
(D. Del. 1969); Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549 P.2d 846, 130 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976). But see the following state decisions: Nemes v. Smith, 37 Mich. App. 124, 194
N.W.2d 440 (1971) (where court allowed attorney to be present at examination); Tietjen v.
Department of Labor and Industries, 13 Wash. App. 86, 534 P.2d 151 (1975) (the court said
the attorney should be allowed to attend).
In Tietjen, the court declared that the presence of the attorney was based on the plain-
tiffs right to counsel. Under this analysis, an attorney would always be allowed to be pre-
sent unless his client expressly waived his right to counsel at this time. The usual justifica-
tions for permitting the client's attorney to be present are that the attorney can observe the
examination and know exactly what is recorded, and that he can guard against the doctor
asking impermissible questions as to the facts at issue in the litigation. These rationales are
more sensible in making the decision within the court's discretion instead of making the
attorney's presence a constitutional mandate. See also Note, Procedural Law-Right to
Counsel in Court Rule 35 Examinations, 11 GONZAGA L. REv. 315 (1975).
49. Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bowles v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co., 107 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1939). Appeal may be had, however, by permission of both the
trial and the Supreme Court by virtue of ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110A, § 308 (1979).
50. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
51. See Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1945); Buck v. Board of Edu-
cation, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Swift v. Swift, 64 F.R.D. 440
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
52. See Costanza v. Monty, 50 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Pierce v. Brovig, 16 F.R.D.
569 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) states in part: (2) Sanctions by Court in which Action is
Pending. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person desig-
nated under Rule 30(b) (6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or
Rule 35, the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following- (A) An order that the matters regarding
which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for
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the recalcitrant party or prohibit that person from presenting evi-
dence in support of his claims. Further, the court can find that the
disputed facts have been determined against the disobedient per-
son." Furthermore, a party need not himself be the intended sub-
ject of the examination in order to be accountable for noncompli-
ance with an order. Thus, unless a party makes a showing of a
good faith effort to comply, he may be subject to Rule 37(b)(2)
sanctions for failure to produce for examination a person in his
custody or control.' One sanction is specifically barred by the rule,
however. A party who fails to comply with an order for an exami-
nation cannot be held in contempt of court.56
Exchange of Reports
The person examined may request a copy of the doctor's re-
port. " After a party fulfills this request, he may in turn ask the
examinee for other reports concerning the same condition." A re-
quest under the rule thereby operates as a waiver of any physician-
patient privilege."
the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (B)
An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence; (C) An order
striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against the disobedient party; (D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; (E) Where a party has failed
to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce another for examina-
tion, such orders as are listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the
party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such person for examination.
54. Rule 37(b)(2).
55. Advisory Committee Note to 1970 Amendment FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
56. Prior to the 1970 Amendments to the Rules of Discovery, the only unavailable sanc-
tion was arrest. This change makes it clear that contempt sanctions, whether fines or impris-
onment, cannot be used for refusals of orders under Rule 35. It is arguable, however, that
the contempt sanction should be available. See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
57. Rule 35(b). One court explained the rationale of Rule 35 by stating, "[Tihe proce-
dure outlined in Rule 35(b) merely makes available a method by which an examined party
can avoid having to show cause for the receipt of the report of his adversary examination of
him, if he is willing to waive any privilege that may be of benefit to him." Buflington v.
Wood, 351 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1965). Even if operating without a Rule 35 order, the
examined party can always request and receive a copy of the report under the Rule. Keil v.
Himes, 13 F.R.D. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Compare the marked difference between the federal
rule and the Illinois rule regarding exchange of reports. See note 81-82 infra and accompa-
nying text.
568. Rule 35(b).
59. When in the realm of privileges it is crucial to determine whether state or federal law
applies. The physician-patient privilege is substantive under the Erie doctrine; thus state
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Where the reports are privileged, it becomes important to deter-
privilege law must be applied in diversity cases. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1237
(N.D. Miss. 1970). Once it is determined that a state does or does not have a physician-
patient statute, Rule 35 is applicable as a rule of federal procedure. Bethel v. Thornbrough,
311 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1962); Leazynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10 (D.C. Md. 1961). Thus, Rule
35(b) may independently operate to waive the state-given privilege in diversity cases. If,
however, the examined party does not request a copy of the examination, the state privilege
remains intact thereby precluding discovery of the physician's reports in the examined
party's possession. Nonetheless, independent of Rule 35, the state privilege may be waived
by virtue of the state statute's provisions for waiver, thus once again rendering the reports
susceptible to discovery by virtue of the discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(3) and (4), or
Rule 34. (Prior to 1970 doubts were expressed about the ability to use the other discovery
rules in conjunction with Rule 35. The 1970 amendments clarified this by adding subsection
three to Rule 35(b). The subsection declares that Rule 35 does not preclude other forms of
discovery.)
Moreover, when medical reports are non-privileged, discovery under the other rules does
not depend on a "request" by the examined party. For example, where the examined party
does not cause an exchange by requesting a copy of the report to the court-ordered exami-
nation, the opposing party may still motion for the production of the examined party's per-
sonal doctor's reports under Rule 34.
However, the movant must classify the type of physician-expert from whom the report is
sought for purposes of overcoming the applicable work-product obstacles in Rule 26. Buff-
ington v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965).
Rule 26(b)(4) governs experts retained in anticipation of litigation. The Rule distin-
guishes between testifying and non-testifying experts, assigning various prerequisite show-
ings of "necessity" of discovery to each category. Where the expert-physician is one retained
prior to the institution of suit and no privileges exist, his reports should be generally dis-
coverable under Rule 26. For further treatment of the work-product privilege, see Note,
Discovery and the Work Product Privilege, 11 Loy. U. CHI. 863 (1980). For a further analy-
sis of the relationship between Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and Rule 35, see Graham, Discovery of
Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Part One, An Ana-
lytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Graham].
Although Rule 35(b)(3) permits reference to other discovery provisions, one court permit-
ted a type of discovery which far exceeded any authorized by the Rules. In Callahan v.
Burton, 487 P.2d 515 (1971), the court held that once the doctor-patient privilege is waived,
the defendant's attorney may question the plaintiff's personal physician outside the pres-
ence of the plaintiff's attorney. However, another court appropriately held that none of the
various conventional discovery devices provides for a private conversation between defen-
dant's attorneys and plaintiff's attending physician; the depositions of the doctor or the
production of his report are the desired methods of discovery as limited by Rule
26(b)(4)(B). Garner v. Ford Motor Company, 61 F.R.D. 22 (D. Ala. 1973).
If the cause is not in federal court by virtue of diversity, but instead involves a federal
question, the existence of privilege is governed by Federal Evidence Rule 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privi-
lege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law.
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mine what constitutes a request under the rule. If the party who
moves for examination expresses a mere willingness to furnish the
report"0 or if the doctor on his own forwards it to the person ex-
amined," no request is involved, and the privilege remains. Simi-
larly, where the court on its own motion orders the movant to pro-
vide the examinee with a copy of the report, other reports are still
protected.62 However, if the examined party motions for the court
order, the privilege is waived.63
The waiver extends to any privilege both in the pending action
and in any future action concerning the same subject.6 The waiver
goes beyond the physician's written reports and includes "the tes-
timony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter
examine the party with respect to the same mental or physical
condition." 5
Where a physician-patient privilege exists, the examined party's
medical reports can only be discovered through the operation of
Rule 35(b)." No other discovery rule provides for a waiver of the
physician-patient privilege.
Thus, Rule 501 provides that, in the absence of a federal statute, federal common law gov-
erns the existence of a privilege in federal question cases. The anomolous result, however, is
that there is no federal common law or statutory physician-patient privilege. Hardy v. Riser,
309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Lind v. Canada Dry Corp., 283 F. Supp. 861 (D.C.
Minn. 1968). For an extensive treatment of the illusory "federal common law doctor-patient
privilege" and some discussion of a psycho-therapist privilege see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 5011021, Standard § 504 [01-071 (1978).
60. Sher v. DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1952).
But see Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Miss. 1970). In Hardy, the court expressly
disapproved Sher, contending that it ignored an important federal policy favoring admission
of evidence and instead favored mere technical rules of construction.
See also Chastain v. Evennou, 35 F.R.D. 350 (D. Utah 1964). In Chastain, a physical
examination and exchange of reports was agreed upon between the parties. But upon ex-
change, the examined party withheld part of a report that he contended was irrelevant.
Even though the parties operated without a court order, the court held that the spirit of
Rule 35 demanded a full exchange and that the withheld information was highly relevant.
The court enforced the informal agreement between parties as if there had been a court-
ordered examination and mandatory exchange of reports under the rule.
61. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
62. See Benning v. Phelps, 249 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1957).
63. Weir v. Simmons, 233 F. Supp. 657 (D. Neb. 1964).
64. Rule 35(b)(2).
65. Rule 35(b)(2).
66. This statement presumes that the privilege has not been waived by virtue of a waiver
provision in a state statute.
Court-Ordered Examinations
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 215
History
In 1957, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Illinois courts pos-
sess the inherent power to order an examination. 7 In People ex rel
Noren v. Dempsey, the court overturning an earlier line of cases,58
found that the inviolability of the person is secondary to the need
for relevant evidence." The court rejected the argument that any
change should come from the legislature stating that such an argu-
ment overlooked the power of the courts to regulate procedure. 0
Currently, the power to order examinations is codified in Supreme
Court Rule 215.71
Elements of Rule 215
Rule 215(a) is generally very similar to Federal Rule 35(a). As in
the federal rule, courts may order examinations only of parties or
persons under the control or custody of parties.72 Furthermore, the
rule is subject to the same "in controversy" and "good cause" re-
quirements as in the federal rule. Indeed, Illinois courts have gen-
erally looked to interpretations of the federal rule when construing
215(a). s
Procedural Considerations
Rule 215 outlines several procedures which are designed to pre-
vent undue burden on the potential examinee. A request for a
court-ordered examination must be made within a reasonable time
67. People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780 (1957).
68. Id. at 289-92, 139 N.E.2d at 781-82. See, e.g., Parker v. Winslow, 102 Ill. 272, 279
(1882), which merely stated: "The court had no power to make or enforce such an order [for
physical examination] . . ."
69. Id. at 293, 139 N.E.2d at 784.
70. Id. at 293, 139 N.E.2d at 783.
71. The present Illinois enabling statute provides that discovery shall be subject to rules
promulgated by the Illinois Supreme Court. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58(1) (1979). Pursuant
to this statute, Rule 215 was enacted, and has remained substantially unchanged in form
since 1957.
72. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215.
73. In re Stevenson, 44 Il1. 2d 525, 256 N.E.2d 766, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). See
generally Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 JOHN. MAR. J. OF PRAc. AND
PROC. 22, 81-86 (1968).
For further discussion of the element of good cause, see Eskandani v. Phillips, 61 111. 2d
183, 334 N.E.2d 146 (1975) (good cause demonstrated by affidavit from executor and letters
from physicians); People ex rel. DeVos v. Laurin, 73 I11. App. 3d 219, 391 N.E.2d 164 (1979)
(no good cause shown for second blood test examination when examining party stated that
she had no reason to believe that first test was not done accurately).
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before trial. 4 This motion should suggest who will perform the ex-
amination. Nonetheless, the court retains discretion to disregard
that recommendation. 75 Further, the party asking for the examina-
tion must pay the doctor's fees. Unlike the federal rule, however,
the Illinois rule requires that the movant compensate the examinee
for lost time.7 6 A request will be denied where the examinee other-
wise would be required to travel an unreasonable distance." As an
additional safeguard, the plaintiff may have anyone, including his
attorney, present at the examination.7
As in the federal rule, Illinois Rule 215 authorizes the imposition
of sanctions for noncompliance with the examination order. How-
ever, unlike the federal rule, Rule 215 7 additionally permits the
use of the contempt sanction.80
Rule 215(c) and the Physician's Report
The Illinois provision governing the physician's report of the
court-ordered examination differs substantially from the federal
rule. Rule 215(c) provides that the report must be given to the ex-
amined party. In contrast, Rule 35(b) provides that the person who
moves for the exam is only obligated to provide the report if the
examined party requests it. Also, under 215(c), delivery of the re-
port to the examinee does not give the party who asked for the
exam the power to obtain other reports concerning the same condi-
tion. On the other hand, the federal rule would confer this right if
74. See, e.g., Bean v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 84 Ill. App. 3d 395, 405 N.E.2d 418
(1980); Crown v. Village of Elmwood Park, 118 Ill. App. 2d 278, 255 N.E.2d 47 (1969); Es-
tate of Ragen, 79 Il. App. 3d 8, 398 N.E.2d 198 (1979).
75. Rule 215(a).
76. Rule 215(b).
77. Some federal courts have held that if a plaintiff has filed an action in one forum but
lives across the country, he must still submit to an examination in the forum where the suit
is filed. See Hunter v. Riverside Community Memorial Hosp., 58 F.R.D. 218 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Costanza v. Monty, 50 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
78. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 100 (1977). The Committee comments give no rationale for
the exclusion of defendants from this provision. See note 90 infra and accompanying text.
79. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. A recent Illinois decision, Krasnow v.
Bender, 78 Ill. 2d 42, 397 N.E.2d 1381 (1979), imposed sanctions on the examinee's attorney
for directing the examinee not to answer the doctor's questions. The court stated that this
advice was an unreasonable interference with the examination.
80. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c). See, e.g., People ex rel. Coleman v. Ely, 71 Ill.
App. 3d 701, 390 N.E.2d 140 (1979) (where court found defendant to be in contempt of
court and sentenced him to serve five days in the House of Correction for failure to undergo
second blood test); Zavaleta v. Zavaleta, 43 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 358 N.E.2d 13 (1976) (plaintiff
was cited for contempt and sentenced to not more than ten days in the Cook County Jail).
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the examinee requested the report.81 Because of these differences,
the examinee under Rule 215 does not waive his doctor-patient
privilege when he receives the results of the court-ordered
examination.8 2
Nevertheless, reports held by the examined party will ordinarily
be discoverable under the general discovery provisions. The Illinois
doctor-patient privilege contains an exception where the patient's
condition "is an issue" in a civil case.83 Since the provision is not
unlike the "in controversy" requirement, the privilege may have
already been waived prior to the request for the examination by
virtue of the filing of a complaint or other responsive pleading."
Impartial Medical Experts
Illinois courts may order examinations by impartial medical ex-
perts."5 These doctors are selected from a pool of qualified physi-
cians designated by the Illinois State Medical Society, and reim-
bursed by the court.
The court's power to order impartial examinations varies with
the stage of the proceeding. Before trial, the exam may be ordered
where the results would materially aid resolution of the case. s6
During trial, only compelling circumstances would justify this pro-
cedure.8 7 The impartial medical experts provision has no specific
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8
81. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
82. But see notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1(4) (1979).
84. Nonetheless, the information may still be protected under the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act. See notes 106-115 infra and accompanying
text.
85. Rule 215(d). Several jurisdictions have implemented impartial medical testimony
systems. Illinois has patterned its system after the Rule in the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court. Comment, Impartial Medical Testimony Plans, 55 Nw. U.L.
REv. 700 (1961). See Historical and Practice Notes Rule 215(d). See generally Comment,
Impartial Medical Testimony, 47 MARQ. L. REV. 522 (1964).
86. Rule 215(d)(1).
87. Rule 215(d)(2). In the case of In re the Estate of Liebling, 118 Ill. App. 2d 460, 254
N.E.2d 531 (1970), the trial court had appointed an impartial medical expert near the end of
the trial to resolve contradictory testimony by other physicians. The appellate court upheld
the propriety of the trial court's action, stating that the conflicting evidence on the party's
condition was a "compelling consideration." Id. at 534.
88. However, FED. R. EviD. 706 provides for court-appointed experts. It is not limited to
medical experts. Also, some jurisdictions of federal district courts have local rules providing
for impartial medical experts. See, e.g., Rule 20 of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.
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PROPOSALS
A comparison of Illinois Rule 215 and Federal Rule 35 indicates
several areas where changes and improvements can be made. Fede-
ral practice under Rule 35 should be changed in three areas to co-
incide with the Illinois practice: reimbursement for the examinee's
lost time, use of the contempt sanction for noncompliance, and the
presence of the plaintiff's attorney at the examination. Illinois
Rule 215 could be improved by deleting the impartial medical ex-
perts section, hence following Rule 35. Both the Illinois and the
federal rule could be improved by expanding the scope of persons
to whom the rules apply.
Improving the Federal Rule
Federal Rule 35 should direct that the person who requests the
examination must reimburse the examinee for lost time. Such re-
imbursement is required under the Illinois provision.89 Rule 215 is
more judicious because the examination benefits the movant. Ac-
cordingly, the movant should bear the cost of the examinee's lost
time.
The federal rule could be improved further if it were amended to
allow an examinee" to have his attorney present during a court-
ordered examination. At the present time, federal law leaves the
decision to the court's discretion."
In exercising its discretion, a federal court must weigh conflict-
ing policies. A party's need for adequate representation militates in
favor of having the attorney present. The attending attorney can
ensure that no improper questioning of the patient takes place
during the examination. Moreover, when the attorney knows what
transpired at the examination, he can better represent his client.
The court must balance these advantages against the possibility
that the attorney's presence would interfere with the physician's
task.
When the matter is within the court's discretion, as in Rule 35,
the court usually bars counsel" on the premise that the risk that
the attorney will burden the examination outweighs any benefit
89. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
90. Although the Illinois rule grants this right to only the plaintiff, and not the defen-
dant examinee, the distinction appears unfounded. Hence, both the federal and the Illinois
rule should grant this right to any party-examinee.
91. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
92. See note 48 supra.
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which may accrue to the plaintiff. These courts may also be swayed
by the belief that party-selected physicians are unbiased officers of
the court and not representatives of an opposing party.9
The Illinois position which accords the examinee the right to his
attorney's presence at the exam is preferable, however. The exami-
nation is but one part of an adversative proceeding. The physician
is paid by the party who requested the examination and may
attempt to further the movant's cause. The Illinois rule thus guar-
antees protection to the examined plaintiff by allowing him to
choose who is present instead of leaving the decision to the court's
discretion.94
Finally, the federal rule should be amended to permit use of the
contempt sanction in order to compel a person to submit to a val-
idly ordered examination. Indeed, without this powerful sanction a
person may persist in refusing to submit to an examination. In
some instances the absence of the examination report may seri-
ously burden or deprive the prosecution of its claim. For example,
when a mother is trying to prove paternity, a blood test of the pu-
tative father may be a strong element of her case.95 Thus, a refusal
to take the test may severely hamper the mother's suit.
A weak argument may be made" against the use of the con-
tempt sanction. Such an argument would be premised on the al-
leged privacy interests of the examinee. It could be asserted that a
person who exercises his right to be free from bodily intrusions
cannot then be inflicted with a sanction which likewise operates
against the "person." The argument fails, however, when it is rec-
ognized that the court does not order the examination until the
"good cause" requirement is met. Thus the examination is ordered
only after the threshold safeguard for the privacy interest has been
satisfied.' 7 Thereafter, the examinee has no right to refuse to sub-
mit to examination premised on a privacy interest which, in effect,
has been determined not to exist for purposes of the examination.
Accordingly, as in Illinois, the federal rule should permit the use of
the contempt sanction as well as the general sanctions for noncom-
pliance with the order.
93. See The Italia, 27 F. Supp. 785 (1939); Warrick v. Brode, 46 F.R.D. 427 (D.C. Del.
1969). See also State v. McMullan, 297 S.W.2d 431 (1957).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 100 (1977).
95. Such cases would include divorce and paternity actions.
96. See also Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, at 17-18).
97. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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Improving the Illinois Rule
Rule 215 could be improved by eliminating the impartial medi-
cal experts clause.' 8 The provision is designed to reduce the
problems associated with a party-selected medical expert. A party
generally selects a doctor who will be the best witness and not nec-
essarily the best scientist. This prompts the other party to find a
doctor who will support his side. The battle of the experts which
frequently results may thoroughly confuse the jury and consume
an inordinate amount of time."
Although these problems are substantial, it is unlikely that a
system of impartial medical experts will solve them. If a court ap-
points an impartial witness and his testimony favors one side, the
opposing counsel will guarantee that his own expert counters this
testimony.100 Also, if the jury is aware that one of the medical ex-
perts is an impartial court-appointed witness, they may give his
testimony more weight. 101 The provision creates as many problems
as it allegedly solves. Finally, the cost of this system alone mili-
tates against its existence.1'
Improving Both Rules
Both the state and federal rules would be bettered if they were
broadened to include certain persons other than parties or persons
under the control or custody of parties. This revision would be es-
pecially beneficial in two areas: examination of a party's employee
98. See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
99. Comment, Impartial Medical Testimony, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 522 (1964). See, e.g.,
Postell v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., No. C78-150A (N.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 1980).
100. Sometimes the party does not have to counter with his own experts. If he objects
strenuously enough to the court's selection of an impartial expert, the court may acquiesce
and not appoint one. See Wisconsin Marina Co. v. Lawn 'N' Sport Power Mower Sales &
Serv., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 89 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
101. Thus, if two different schools of thought on a diagnosis or prognosis are equally
valid, the accident of which school the impartial expert is from decides the case. The obvi-
ous solution to this problem is to keep the jury uninformed as to the expert's status. Illinois
state courts have adopted this approach in Wong v. Richards, 10 Ill. App. 3d 514, 294
N.E.2d 784 (1973). But see Branch v. Seiler, 54 Ill. App. 3d 693, 370 N.E.2d 873 (1977),
holding that informing the jury of the impartial expert's status was only harmless error. See
also Hehir v. Bowers, 85 IMI. App. 3d 625 (1980), holding that while counsel acted improperly
in implying that the expert was court-appointed rather than counsel-selected, it was harm-
less error. Several jurisdictions permit the jury to know the expert's status. See IMPARTIAL
MEDICAL TESIMONY, Naw YoRK BAR ASsOCUTION SPEcAuL REPORT 33-34 (1956); Comment,
Impartial Medical Testimony Plans, 55 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 700, 724 n. 102 (1961) (relating to
Northern District of Illinois jurisdiction).
102. The state must bear the cost of the physician's fee and of administration.
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and examinations of witnesses.
Although a person who is an. employee can usually be joined as a
party,'03 in some situations, this procedure is unattractive because
of tactical considerations. For instance, the employee may be a
highly sympathetic defendant. Another situation where a broader
scope could be helpful is where the court wants to determine the
witnesses' capacity to testify. An examination would be the most
reliable method for determining capacity.
If an extension in the rules is not forthcoming, Illinois courts
could nevertheless order the examinations based on their inherent
power under the common law.'"s Federal courts, in contrast, have
no such inherent powers;10' any extension must be effected legisla-
tively. Moreover, in either the federal or Illinois rule, any amend-
ment must be narrowly drawn because of the likelihood of abuse;
one party could harass another, for example, by requesting that
numerous witnesses submit to examinations thus delaying the trial.
Requiring a strict standard of necessity for the examination would
reduce the probability of such abuse.
CONFLICT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES CONFIDENTIALITY ACT WITH RULE 215
The new Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confi-
dentiality Act [the Act],'" effective January 1, 1979, may conflict
with Rule 215. The Act generally bars the use of a patient's psychi-
103. See note 21 supra.
104. People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780 (1957). On the
other hand, an argument may be made that to order exams beyond the scope of those per-
mitted in Rule 215 would be usurping the legislature of its authority to make law. Thus, the
argument would permit the exercise of the court's inherent powers only in those non-legis-
lated areas.
105. But see Dinsel v. Pennsylvania R.R., 144 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1956), where the
conduct of the defendant's employee who was not a party was determinative of the defen-
dant's liability. The court held that the employee could be given an eye examination. Not
mentioning Rule 35, the court considered that its authority to order the examination arose
from the necessity of providing the jury with essential data. The court stated: "It would,
therefore, appear to be the duty of the court to make positive that the jury would not have
to speculate or conjecture as to the condition of the eyesight of the employee, Eckenrode,
and to extend every help that might be possible, through the aid of medical science, to
enlighten the court and jury . . ." Id. at 882.
For state court decisions that have gone beyond their similar Rule 35 provisions and
ordered examinations of non-parties, see Lewin v. Jackson, 108 Ariz. 27, 492 P.2d 406 (1972)
(ordered to determine capacity of witness); State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMul-
lan, 297 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957) (ordered wife of party to submit to exam). See also note 7
supra and accompanying text.
106. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 801 et seq. (1979).
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atric records in court. 10 7 Section 810(a)(4) of the Act, however, ex-
cepts records that report the results of a court-ordered examina-
tion.'0 The section explicitly applies only where the patient is a
party; it does not mention a person under the legal control or cus-
tody of a party. Thus, the Act may not apply to all Rule 215
mental examinations.
A hypothetical will illustrate the potential conflict of this section
and Rule 215: -Daughter is a mentally retarded minor. She is hit by
an automobile while crossing the street. Father is her legal guard-
ian and sues in her behalf. The defendant driver raises contribu-
tory negligence as a result of Daughter's incompetency as a
defense.
If the driver moves for an examination, the request should be
granted. The requirements for a Rule 215 order have been met:
Daughter is in the legal custody of Father, her mental condition is
in controversy, and good cause is shown. Under Rule 215, the court
will order a mental examination and the driver will automatically
receive the physician's report.
Under Section 810(a)(4), however, a problem arises. The daugh-
107. § 810(a)(1) provides in part, (a) Except as provided herein, in any civil, criminal,
administrative, or legislative proceeding, or in any proceeding preliminary thereto, a recipi-
ent, and a therapist on behalf and in the interest of a recipient, has the privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent the disclosure of the recipient's record or communications. (1)
Records and communications may be disclosed in a civil or administrative proceeding in
which the recipient introduces his mental condition or any aspect of his services received for
such condition as an element of his claim or defense, if and only to the extent the court in
which the proceedings have been brought, or, in the case of an administrative proceeding,
the court to which an appeal or other action for review of an administrative determination
may be taken, finds, after in camera examination of testimony or other evidence, that it is
relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, and otherwise clearly admissi-
ble; that other satisfactory evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts
sought to be established by such evidence; and that disclosure is more important to the
interests of substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient rela-
tionship or to the recipient or other whom disclosure is likely to harm. No record of commu-
nication between a therapist and a recipient shall be deemed relevant for purposes of this
subsection, except the fact of treatment, the cost of services and the ultimate diagnosis
unless the party seeking disclosure of the communication clearly establishes in the trial
court a compelling need for its production.
108. § 810(a)(4) states: (4) Records and communications made to or by a therapist in the
course of examination ordered by a court for good cause shown may, if otherwise relevant
and admissible, be disclosed in a judicial or administrative proceeding in which the recipient
is a party or in appropriate pretrial proceedings, provided such court has found that the
recipient has been as adequately and as effectively as possible informed before submitting to
such examination that such records and communications would not be considered confiden-
tial or privileged. Such records and communications shall be admissible only as to issues
involving the recipient's physical or mental condition and only to the extent that these are
germane to such proceedings.
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ter would not be a "party" under the Act. The party suing is the
Father; the girl is only in his legal custody. Unless "party" is ex-
panded beyond its usual definition, the report could be privileged
under the broad definition of "confidential communication" stated
in the Act. 10 9
Another aspect of Section 810(a)(4) may affect the procedure in-
volved in Rule 215 requests. Section 810(a)(4) requires that, prior
to ordering the examination, the court must make °a preliminary
finding that the patient understands as fully as possible that the
report of the examination will not be privileged. 110 It is not clear
whether the court must now make this finding before ordering a
mental examination under Rule 215. Courts will probably treat
Section 810(a)(4) so that it harmonizes with Rule 215." This in-
terpretation would introduce substantial procedural burdens which
have not previously been imposed under Rule 215 proceedings.
In addition to these possible direct conflicts with Rule 215, an-
other section of the Act may clash with certain procedures pres-
ently involved in court-ordered examinations. Ordinarily, the doc-
tor-patient privilege is waived any time the party's condition is in
issue,"' hence, the opposing party may discover reports made by
the personal physicians of the examined party.1 3 Under Section
810(a)(1) of the Act, however, the privilege applies unless the pa-
tient/party puts his own condition in issue and the court finds that
a strict standard has been satisfied." 4 Under this test, the court
must find after an in camera hearing that the report is relevant,
probative, and otherwise clearly admissible, that other satisfactory
evidence is not available regarding the facts sought to be estab-
lished by the report, and that disclosure is more important to the
interests of substantial justice than protection from any injury
109. See § 802(1).
110. § 810(a)(4) also requires "good cause," "in controversy" and relevancy all of which
are already subsumed in a Rule 215 order.
111. The applicability of § 810(a)(4) to Rule 215 is rendered moot for federal diversity
purposes. A federal court's powers to order examinations exists independently of any state
law. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
112. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
113. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
114. The Act's privilege preempts the doctor-patient privilege when in conflict. "In the
event of a conflict between the application of this Section and the Mental Health and De-
velopmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act ... to a specific situation, the provisions of the
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act shall control." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1979).
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which disclosure is likely to cause.115 Thus, where a party's mental
condition is in controversy, the Act controls and the medical re-
ports are more likely to be unavailable to the patient's opponent.
This new privilege afforded by the Act is less of a problem in
federal diversity cases. Under Rule 35, if the examined party wants
a copy of the report of the court-ordered examination, he must re-
quest it. If he requests it, he waives any privilege extant under
state law, including the Act's privilege.11 6
The availability of waiver under Rule 35 creates important dif-
ferences between Illinois and federal law. If a party does not want
his personal psychiatric records discovered, he is in a much better
position under Illinois law than under federal law. When a mental
examination is ordered in Illinois, the examined party automati-
cally receives his adversary's report but does not waive his privi-
lege under the new Act.
The party requesting an examination, however, is in a better
situation under federal law than under Illinois law. Under Rule 35,
if the party examined wants to obtain a report of the court-ordered
examination, he must waive any privilege he has. Upon such a re-
quest by the examinee, all of his personal medical reports become
discoverable under Rule 35, including psychiatric reports.
CONCLUSION
The court-ordered examination is a great discovery tool. Despite
areas in need of reform, Illinois Rule 215 and Federal Rule 35 work
well in practice. However, because of the significant differences be-
tween the rules, an attorney intending to seek an examination of
the opposing party must consider the disparate provisions before
determining where to file suit or defend.
PAULA M. BECKER
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 810(a)(1) (1979).
116. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.
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